The medical profession in some countries displays a gated structure. Rather than approaching a specialist directly, a patient will …rst seek a referral from a general practitioner. Such an industry structure might help to alleviate adverse selection problems between parties that interact infrequently. General practitioners aggregate many short-run transactions between various patients and a particular specialist. As such, they might be able to learn the specialist's level of pro…ciency more rapidly than an individual patient. However, the presence of a positive information externality means that too few patients will seek a referral. As such, some form of regulation that encourages patients to seek a referral might be warranted.
I Introduction
An industry has a gated structure when consumers seek a referral to a producer from an intermediary, rather than accessing the services of a producer directly. The medical profession in some countries displays such a structure. In the medical industries of some Commonwealth countries, including Australia, it is unusual for patients to visit a specialist without …rst obtaining a referral from a general practitioner (GP).
1 Indeed, while it is permissible for a patient to be treated by a specialist without a referral in Australia, there are …nancial This paper is a modi…ed version of Chapter 3 of the author's PhD dissertation (Eldridge 2007a) . The author would like to thank Suren Basov, Max Stinchcombe and an anonymous referee for helpful advice and comments.
1 Commonwealth countries in which many patients obtain a referral from a general practitioner before seeking the services of a specialist include Australia (Powell-Davies and Fry 2005, p. incentives o¤ered to patients who obtain a referral for treatment by a specialist. In most medical specialties, patients will be reimbursed a larger portion of their treatment costs under the Medicare system in Australia if they obtain a referral before seeking treatment.
2 This raises two interesting questions. Why do we observe a gated structure in the medical industry? Why might government regulation be required to support this gated industry structure? In this paper, we explore a potential answer to each of these questions.
Suppose that the ability of medical specialists is private information. In these circumstances, treatment markets may su¤er from adverse selection problems. 3 The potential for such problems to result in market failure is well understood. Nonetheless, there are a number of ways in which the parties to a transaction might be able to reduce the impact of adverse selection. The informed party might attempt to signal his type. Alternatively, the uninformed party might attempt to design a screening contract that induces the informed party to truthfully reveal his type. However, in a static setting, such mechanisms might only be partially successful. 4 If the transacting parties interacted repeatedly, then reputation e¤ects might potentially reduce the incidence of adverse selection below the level that would occur in a static setting. Unfortunately, there are many occasions in which parties to a transaction do not repeatedly interact. In the absence of repeated interaction, reputation cannot be relied upon to overcome adverse selection. As such, we might expect adverse selection problems to be particularly severe in markets characterised by few or infrequent interactions between the trading parties. A gated industry structure might provide one possible solution to potential adverse selection problems between parties that interact infrequently. Intermediaries aggregate many short-run transactions between various consumers and a particular producer. This might enable an intermediary to learn the producer's level of pro…ciency more rapidly than an individual consumer. This paper is organised as follows. First, we outline a competitive model of a health care market in which treatment outcomes depend on the ability of the treating specialist, which is private information. We analyse the outcomes in a static version of this health care market. In particular, we characterise the conditions under which the market will fail to exist because of the adverse selection problem. We then proceed to show that if this static market is repeated an in…nite number of times, the resulting dynamic market is less likely to fail to exist than the static market. Following this, we consider the impact of introducing a gated structure to the dynamic health care market. This further reduces the potential for the health care market to fail to exist. A comparison between these three versions of the health care market is then provided. This comparison illustrates the bene…ts of both repetition and the presence of intermediaries. Following this, we show that the bene…ts of the gated structure might not be achievable without government intervention. The reason for this is the presence of a positive information externality. Finally, we conclude by comparing the results of this paper with those that we obtained in Eldridge (2007b) and with some features of actual health care markets.
II A competitive model of health care markets
Consider an economy with three groups of agents who live forever. These groups are patients, general practitioners (GPs) and medical specialists. Let patients be indexed by i 2 f1; 2;
; Ig, GPs by j 2 f1; 2; ; Jg and specialists by k 2 f1; 2;
; Kg. We will assume that there are an in…nite number of patients (I ! 1) and specialists (K ! 1 ), but only a …nite numbers of GPs (J < 1). Patients are either well (d = 0) or sick (d = 1) In each period, a patient is randomly allocated a disease state, d 2 f0; 1g. Following this, each patient can choose whether or not to seek treatment if he is sick. Treatment can sometimes result in a cure, improving the patient's health status for that period. The probability that a sick patient is cured by treatment increases with the ability of the treating specialist. Patients can seek a referral to the specialist from a GP if they believe that this will increase the probability that they are treated by a high ability specialist. Both referrals and treatments come at a price. For budget constrained patients, the bene…ts of an increased probability of good health need to be weighed against the foregone consumption of other goods that expenditure on health care entails. We will assume that patients visit neither a GP nor a specialist when they are healthy.
5
All agents in this economy are price takers who behave as though the existing prices are exogenously speci…ed. We will focus on stationary equilibria for this economy, so that prices don't change over time. The price per referral from any GP is w, while the price per treatment from a medical specialist is r. We will assume throughout that specialist ability is neither observable nor veri…able by outside parties, although it may be learned by patients and GPs that interact with the specialist. As such, the treatment price cannot vary with specialist ability.
For payo¤ purposes, time is assumed to be discrete in this economy. Time periods are indexed by t 2 f0; 1; 2; g, with payo¤s occurring at the end of each period. In each period, the market opens and the agents interact within the market. Note that not all agents move at once in the market. The market process involves sequential moves by various agents. Thus the timing of the moves in the market process is important. We will maintain the assumption that time is discrete and index time within a period by s 2 f0; 1; 2; g. In this fashion, each point in time can be given a unique time stamp of the form (t; s) 2 f0; 1; 2; g 2 = Z 2 + .
II.1 The timing of the market in each period
Prior to the beginning of the …rst stage game, at time t = 1, Nature selects an ability level for each potential specialist as a sequence of independent draws from a common distribution. Any given specialist has either high ability ( = 1) or low ability ( = 0). Each specialist's ability level, which is …xed for all time, is observed by nobody except for that specialist. However, it is common knowledge that the probability that any given specialist has a high level of ability is given by 2 (0; 1). At the beginning of each period (s = 0), Nature randomly chooses a disease state for each patient, d i 2 f0; 1g. The disease state for each patient is chosen as a random draw from some common distribution, . The probability that any given patient is sick in any given period is 2 (0; 1), while the probability that a patient is well in any given period is (1 ). The distribution from which these disease states are drawn is common knowledge.
At s = 1, having observed their disease state, patients choose whether or not to seek treatment and, if they seek treatment, whether or not to seek a referral from their GP. If they seek a referral, they choose which GP to visit at s = 2. At s = 3, GPs choose the specialists to which they will refer their patients. At this point in the stage game, any patients who chose to self-refer at s = 2 will also choose the specialist from whom they will seek treatment. We will assume that GPs follow up on the outcomes from treatment of any of the patients they refer. In this fashion, the GP knows the entire history of outcomes for each of his previous referrals at the start of each period. This allows him to use this information when making his current referral decisions.
Following this, at s = 4, specialists treat each patient that has been referred to them. Finally, at s = 5, Nature chooses whether or not each patient is cured. If a patient is cured, he will have good health in that period (h = 1), while if the patient is not cured, he will have bad health (h = 0). We will assume that treatment by a high ability specialist always results in a patient being cured, while treatment by a low ability specialist never results in a patient being cured. Furthermore, any patient who chose not to seek treatment will not be cured.
II.2 Player objectives
Every agent in this game is assumed to maximise the discounted present value of a sequence of per-period von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions. Furthermore, they all have a common rate of time preference, represented by the stationary discount factor 2 [0; 1). Thus di¤erences in the preferences of the three groups of agents arise from di¤erences in their per-period preferences. These are outlined below.
II.2.1 Patients
Patients all have identical per-period preferences de…ned over their expenditure on health care (p) and their health state (h). These preferences may be represented by a quasi-linear per-period Bernoulli utility function of the form
where B(0) is normalised to zero and B(1) = B > 0.
The health state in each period is a random variable and may vary across patients. It depends on whether or not the patient is sick, whether or not treatment is sought and, if so, the ability of the treating specialist. If a sick patient receives treatment from a high ability specialist, he will de…nitely be cured. If a sick patient receives treatment from a low ability specialist, he will de…nitely not be cured. Since each patient knows his disease status before having to make any decisions about treatment, the probability of good health in period t is given by
1 if either d = 0 or high ability treatment is received with certainty when d = 1; if d = 1 and treatment is sought from a specialist whose ability is not known; 0 if d = 1 and either low ability treatment is received with certainty or no treatment is sought.
Expenditure on health care in any given period may also vary across patients. It will depend on whether or not the patient seeks treatment and, if so, whether or not the patient also seeks a referral. We will assume that patients do not seek a referral if they do not also desire treatment. Thus a patient's expenditure on health care is given by
if neither treatment nor referral is sought; r if treatment is sought without a referral; w + r if both treatment and referral are sought.
This allows us to express a patient's per-period expected utility as
II.2.2 General practitioners
GPs are assumed to be risk-neutral. As such, they maximise their expected pro…ts. The Bernoulli utility function that represents their per-period preferences is simply their per-period pro…t. Let n j;1;t denote the number of referrals a particular GP makes in period t. Assuming that they have a constant marginal cost of C GP per referral and no …xed costs, their per-period pro…ts are j = n j;1 (w C GP ), where we have dropped the time subscripts for convenience.
Note that n j;1;t is the number of sick patients in GP j's patient pool in period t. It is a random variable if the GP has a …nite patient pool of size n j;t . However, when the GP has an in…nite patient pool, this source of uncertainty disappears. The reason for this is that n j;1;t converges almost surely to n j;t = 1 as n j;t ! 1.
Proposition 1 n j;1;t converges almost surely to n j;t = 1 as n j;t ! 1.
Proof. First, note that n j;1 = n j;1 n j n j = j n j .
Furthermore,
where 1 i(j);1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the patient in question is sick and the value zero otherwise. Note that GP j has a patient pool consisting of n j patients, including those that do not need the GPs services in the current period. These patients are indexed by i(j) 2 f1; 2; ; n(j)g. Note that each of these indicator variables is a Bernoulli random variable that takes on the value one with probability and zero otherwise. As such, 1 i(j);1
is a sequence of independent and identically distributed Bernoulli random variables in which
Thus, from the strong law of large numbers 6 , we know that Pr lim
This allows us to conclude that j converges almost surely to . Finally, note that lim
Thus we can conclude that n j;1 = j n j a:s:
Hence we know that n j;1;t converges almost surely to n j;t = 1 as n j;t ! 1.
II.2.3 Medical Specialists
Like GPs, medical specialists are assumed to be risk-neutral. As such, a specialist's per-period Bernoulli utility function is simply his pro…t. This pro…t will depend on the treatment price (r) and the constant marginal cost of treatment (C S ). We will assume that there are no …xed costs of treatment. Each specialist's per-period per-patient pro…t is given by r C S . Let n k;t denote the number of patients a particular specialist treats in period t. Given this, the specialist's pro…t in period t is simply
In each period, specialists observe the number of patients seeking treatment from them before actually treating any patients. As such, the only uncertainty that a¤ects medical specialists relates to the number of patients that will seek their treatment services in future periods. While this may be a function of the outcomes that result from their current and past treatment of patients, there is nothing they can do to in ‡uence these outcomes. Thus specialists will simply maximise their per-period pro…ts.
6 See Billingsley (1995, pp. 85-86) for a discussion of the strong law of large numbers. Note that when GP patient pools are …nite, the number of members in a GP's patient pool is an integer. As such, when we take the limit as this number approaches in…nity, we are restricting our attention to the set of natural numbers. In e¤ect, there is a one-to-one correspondence between each member of a GP's patient pool and each element of the set of natural numbers when that GP has an in…nite patient pool. As such, each GP has a countable number of patients. This ensures that the standard version of the strong law of large numbers applies in the model considered in this paper.
III Static outcomes in competitive health care markets
Before analysing the dynamic model of competitive health care markets, it is useful to consider what would happen in the absence of any repetition whatsoever. To do this, we will initially assume that patients can be a-icted with the disease at most once. As such, patients will only need the services of medical specialist at most once. We will focus on a representative patient (i) who has the disease and a representative specialist (k). We will assume that all agents in this economy are price takers and that all prices are exogenously determined. Specialist will receive the treatment price (r) from each patient that they treat. However, they will also incur a treatment cost equal to C S for each patient that they treat. This treatment cost is independent of their ability.
Proposition 2 (The participation constraint for specialists): Specialists will o¤ er their treatment services if and only if r C S .
Proof. Medical specialists are pro…t maximisers. They can guarantee themselves zero pro…ts by refusing to treat any patients. As such, they will only treat patients if the pro…t per patient is at least zero. This requires that the treatment price either matches or exceeds the cost of treatment for each patient. Now consider a sick patient. If the patient is cured, then he will be in good health (h = 1) for the remainder of the current period. This will yield him bene…ts equal to B(h) = B(1) = B > 0. If the patient is not cured, he will be in bad health (h = 0) for the remainder of the current period. This yields him bene…ts equal to B(h) = B(0) = 0. If the patient is to have any chance of being cured of this disease, he will require treatment by a medical specialist. There are two types of medical specialists, high ability specialists ( = 1) and low-ability specialists ( = 0). If the patient is treated by a high ability specialist, he is guaranteed to be cured. If the patient is treated by a low ability specialist, he is guaranteed not to be cured. Unfortunately, each specialist's ability is private information, known only to that specialist. It is common knowledge, however, that the probability of any given specialist having high ability is 2 (0; 1).
Proposition 3 (The participation constraint for patients): Patients will seek treatment if and only if r B.
Proof. Since the participation constraint for specialists is independent of their ability, patients with rationally believe that the probability of a cure following treatment is equal to the probability that a specialist has high ability. As such, if a patient obtains treatment, his expected utility is:
If a patient does not obtain treatment, he will neither be cured nor will he have to pay the treatment price. As such, his expected utility will be zero. Thus a patient will seek treatment if and only if B r 0. This requires that r B.
The outcomes in this static health care market will vary with the treatment price. If the price is too low, no specialists will o¤er their treatment services.
As such, no patients will be cured. If the treatment price is too high, no patients will seek treatment and hence no patients will be cured. In both cases, patients receive zero expected utility and specialists receive zero pro…t. There will sometimes be an intermediate range of prices in which all patients will seek treatment and all specialists will o¤er their treatment services. In these cases, patients will receive non-negative expected utility and specialists will earn nonnegative pro…ts. However, some patients will be disappointed with the outcome of their treatment. These are the patients that will have been unfortunate enough to be treated by a low ability specialist.
Proposition 4 (Static market existence): If B < C S , then the set of prices at which both patients demand treatment and specialists supply treatment is empty. If B C S , then the set of prices at which both patients demand treatment and specialists supply treatment is non-empty.
Proof. Both the specialist participation constraint and the patient participation constraint are satis…ed if and only if C S r B. This clearly requires that C S B. Thus, if C S > B, there are no values for the treatment price that will satisfy both participation constraints. If C S = B, then there is unique value for the treatment price that will satisfy both participation constraints. This value is r = C S = B. Finally, if C S < B, then there is a range of values for the treatment price that will satisfy both participation constraints. These are r 2 [C; B].
Proposition 5 (Static market outcomes): If the health care market exists, then patients will receive non-negative expected utility and specialists will make nonnegative pro…ts. However, some patients might not be cured following treatment.
Proof. If the health care market exists, then C S r B. This means that
It also means that k = r C S C S C S = 0. Thus patients receive non-negative expected utility and specialists receive nonnegative pro…ts. However, since both high ability specialists and low ability specialists are prepared to o¤er their treatment services for this range of prices, some patients might have sought treatment from a low-ability specialist. Any such patients will not be cured.
IV Dynamic outcomes without general practitioners
Suppose we now play an in…nitely repeated version of the stage game in the absence of GPs. In this version of the dynamic model, any patient that wants to be treated by a specialist needs to seek the services of a specialist without a referral. Before observing his disease state in period zero, a patient's lifetime expected utility is
The expected utility that patients receive in periods when they are well is not a¤ected by their treatment choices when they are sick. As such, we can ignore these terms when considering the impact of treatment decisions on a patient's lifetime expected utility. Given this, for the remainder of this paper we will only focus on the payo¤s that a patient receives in periods when he is sick. The …rst time a patient is a-icted with the disease, he will not have any information about the ability of any of the specialists. As such, he may as well randomly select a specialist from whom to seek treatment if he decides to seek treatment.
Proposition 6 (Treatment payo¤ ): If it is optimal for a patient to seek treatment when he is …rst a-icted with the disease, then it will be optimal for him to seek treatment whenever he is a-icted with the disease. Furthermore, his lifetime expected utility at that point in time is
Proof. The patient does not know the ability of whichever specialist treats him the …rst time he is a-icted with the disease. As such, his expected utility in that period is simply B r. Following treatment, the patient is either cured or not cured. As such, he learns the ability of the treating specialist. If he is cured, then he knows the treating specialist has a high level of ability. If it is ever optimal to seek treatment, then it must be optimal to do so when you know that you will be cured. As such, the patient will seek treatment from that specialist whenever he is sick in future periods. If the patient is not cured in the current period, then he knows the treating specialist has a low level of ability. As such, he will never seek treatment from that specialist again. However, he might still get sick in some future periods. In the next such period, he will need to start from scratch. Since there an in…nite number of potential medical specialists, the problem he will face in that period will be identical to the current one. As such, the lifetime expected utility from that period onwards will be identical to the lifetime expected utility in the current period. Hence, the patient's lifetime expected utility the …rst time he gets sick, prior to treatment, must satisfy the following equation:
Note that this equation can be rewritten as
Solving this equation for the patient's lifetime expected utility (V ) yields:
While we have characterised a patients lifetime expected utility if he chooses to seek treatment, we have not yet established the conditions under which seeking treatment will be optimal. In order to derive these conditions, we …rst need to lifetime expected utility of a sick patient who does not seek treatment.
Proposition 7 (Non-treatment payo¤ ): If it is optimal for a patient not to seek treatment when he is …rst a-icted with the disease, then it will never be optimal for him to seek treatment. Furthermore, his lifetime expected utility at that point in time is zero.
Proof. If the patient does not seek treatment when he is …rst a-icted with the disease, then he will neither be cured in that period nor incur any medical expenses in that period. As such, his expected utility in that period is zero. Furthermore, since he did not seek treatment, he will not learn anything about the ability of any of the medical specialists. Hence he will face an identical problem the next time he gets sick, assuming such an event occurs. If it is optimal for him not to seek treatment the …rst time he gets sick, it must therefore be optimal for him not to seek treatment the next time he gets sick. Thus, by mathematical induction, if it is not optimal for a patient to seek treatment the …rst time he is sick, it will never be optimal for him to seek treatment when he is sick. The lifetime expected utility of such a patient will be zero. Now that we have characterised the payo¤s to a patient, both when he chooses to seek treatment and when he does not, we are in a position to derive the conditions under which it will be optimal for him to seek treatment when he is sick.
Proposition 8 (Participation constraint for patients): A sick patient will seek treatment in this dynamic health care market if and only if
Proof. We have already established that a patient will either always seek treatment when he sick or never do so. Furthermore, we have calculated the lifetime expected utility at the point in time where the patient …rst discovers that he sick for both of these cases. Thus we know that a sick patient will choose to seek treatment if and only if his lifetime expected utility from doing so is at least as large as his lifetime expected utility from not seeking treatment. This requires that
This inequality can be rearranged to obtain
Thus patients will seek treatment whenever the treatment price is not too high.
It is worth noting that the range of treatment prices for which patients will be willing to seek treatment in this dynamic health care market is larger than that in a static health care market. This makes intuitive sense because the bene…ts from seeking treatment in the dynamic market are larger than they are in the static market. As well as the expected bene…ts from treatment in the current period, which occur in both markets, patients who seek treatment will also learn the ability level of the treating specialist. While this has no value in a static market, it yields positive expected utility in a dynamic market.
Proposition 9 (The bene…ts of repetition): The maximum treatment price at which a patient will seek treatment is higher in a dynamic market than it is in a static market.
Proof. Let b r d denote the maximum price at which patients will seek treatment in a dynamic market and b r s denote the maximum price at which patients will seek treatment in a static market. These prices are given by least upper bounds of the patient participation constraints in each model. Note that
which can be rearranged to obtain
Thus we know that b r d > b r s . There is nothing that specialists can do to in ‡uence treatment outcomes, treatment costs or treatment prices. This means that repetition does not a¤ect their participation decisions. As such, the participation constraint facing specialists in dynamic health care markets will be the same as that facing them in static health care markets. We are now in a position to characterise the conditions under which a dynamic health care market will exist. As with a static health care market, the outcomes in this dynamic health care market will vary with the treatment price. If the price is too low, no specialists will o¤er their treatment services. As such, no patients will be cured. If the treatment price is too high, no patients will seek health care treatment and hence no patients will be cured. In both cases, patients receive zero expected utility and specialists receive zero pro…t. There will sometimes be an intermediate range of prices in which all patients will seek treatment and all specialists will o¤er their treatment services. In these cases, patients will receive non-negative lifetime expected utility and specialists will earn non-negative pro…ts. However, some patients will be disappointed with the outcome of their treatment on at least one occasion. These are the patients that will have been unfortunate enough to be treated by a low ability specialist in at least one period.
Proposition 10 (Dynamic market existence): If b r d < C S , then the set of prices at which both patients demand treatment and specialists supply treatment is empty. If b r d C S , then the set of prices at which both patients demand treatment and specialists supply treatment is non-empty. Proposition 11 (Dynamic market outcomes): If the health care market exists, then patients will receive non-negative expected utility and specialists will make non-negative pro…ts. However, some patients might not be cured following treatment.
Proof. If the health care market exists, then the participation constraints of both patients and specialists must be satis…ed. Thus patients receive nonnegative expected utility and specialists receive non-negative pro…ts. However, since both high ability specialists and low ability specialists are prepared to o¤er their treatment services for this range of prices, some patients might have sought treatment from a low-ability specialist on at least one occasion when they were sick. Any such patients will not have been cured on those occasions.
We showed earlier that the repetition present in this dynamic health care market expands the set of treatments prices for which patients will be willing to seek treatment compared to the set of such prices in a static health care market. Since the set of treatment prices for which specialists will o¤er their services is the same in both markets, this means that there is a larger set of circumstances in which a dynamic health care market will exist than in which a static health care market will exist.
Proposition 12 (The relationship between static market existence and dynamic market existence): A dynamic health care market will exist whenever a static health care exists. Furthermore, a static health care market will not exist whenever a dynamic health care market does not exist. However, there are some cases where a dynamic health care market will exist but a static health care market will not exist.
Proof. First, we will show that the existence of a static health care market implies the existence of a dynamic health care market. We have already established that a static health care market will exist if and only if C S b r s . We have also already established that b r d > b r s . Thus, if a static health care market exists, we know that C S < b r d . Thus the the condition that guarantees the existence of a dynamic health care market (C S b r d ) is satis…ed. Thus the existence of a static health care market does indeed imply the existence of a dynamic health care market. Now we show that the non-existence of a dynamic health care market implies the not existence of a static health care market. If a dynamic health care market does not exist, then we know that
r s , this means that C S > b r s as well. This means that, if a dynamic health care market cannot exist, then nor can a static health care market. Finally, we will show that there are some cases in which a dynamic health care market will exist, but a static health care market will not exist. Suppose that b r s < C S b r d .
In this case, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a static health care market is not satis…ed, but the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a dynamic health care market is satis…ed. Hence there are cases where a dynamic health care market can exist but a static health care market cannot exist.
V Dynamic outcomes with general practitioners
Having established what happens in a dynamic health care market without general practitioners, we are now in a position to analyse the impact of introducing them. Suppose, for the moment, that access to treatment by medical specialists is subject to regulation. Speci…cally, we will assume that all sick patients will need to seek a referral before obtaining treatment in the …rst period (period zero). In all subsequent periods, sick patients will be able to choose whether or not to seek a referral before obtaining treatment. A regulation along these lines is needed because of the presence of an information externality. This issue is discussed in more detail later in this paper. Market outcomes in period zero will be deferred until later in this paper as well. In this section, we will focus on outcomes in this form of a dynamic health care market after period zero has …nished. Suppose that there are a …nite number of GPs, each of whom has an in…-nite patient pool in period zero of this dynamic health care market. In these circumstances, each GP must have an in…nite number of sick patients in period zero.
Proposition 13 (Patient numbers): Each GP has an in…nite number of sick patients in period zero.
Proof. We showed earlier that n j;d converges almost surely to d n j = 1 as n j;t ! 1. Given that all GPs have in…nite patient pools in period zero, they will almost surely have an in…nite number of sick patients in that period.
Since each GP has an in…nite number of sick patients in period zero, he can refer a single patient to each of an in…nite number of medical specialists. As such, every GP will …nd at least one medical specialist who has high ability. Proposition 14 (GP learning): In period zero, every GP will almost surely …nd at least one medical specialist who has high ability.
Proof. Recall that any given specialist has high ability with probability and low ability with probability (1 ). Furthermore, recall that GPs observe the treatment outcomes for all of the patients for whom they provide a referral. Since the ability level of each specialist is perfectly revealed by the outcome of any treatment that they provide, a GP will learn the ability level of any specialist to whom he refers at least one patient. Since the GP has an in…nite number of sick patients, he can refer a single patient to each of an in…nite number of medical specialists. The probability that at least one of these specialists has high ability is simply one minus the probability that none of the specialists who treat a patient referred by the GP has high ability. This is given by Pr f# j;k ( = 1) > 0g = 1 lim n(j;1)!1 n(j;1) = 1 0 = 1.
Thus, in period zero, each GP will almost surely …nd at least one medical specialist who has high ability. Thus it is possible for every GP to …nd at least one high ability specialist in period zero. Since the ability of specialists is …xed for all time prior to the opening of the dynamic health care market in period zero, every GP can guarantee a patient that he will be cured if he seeks a referral from that GP in any time period after period zero.
A potential problem with referrals is that GPs might have an incentive to refer patients to a low ability specialist. The reason for this is that patients will no longer need a referral after they learn the identity of a high ability specialist. If GPs are earning positive pro…ts on each referral they make, they might attempt to induce further demand for services by initially making poor referrals. However, patients can deter such a strategy by threatening to dump any GP who refers them to a low ability specialist after period zero. This will remove any incentive that GPs might have to make poor referrals after period zero.
Proposition 15 (GP incentive compatibility constraint): General practitioners cannot pro…t by referring patients to specialists who have low ability after period zero.
Proof. If all consumers employ a strategy that involves never again using the referral services of a GP who refers them to a low ability specialist after period zero, then GPs will not gain anything by referring any patient to a low ability specialist after period zero.. As such, after period zero, GPs will be indi¤erent between referring patients to high ability specialists and referring them to low ability specialists. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that GPs will refer patients to high ability specialists after period zero.
In order to analyse market existence and market outcomes under these circumstances, we need to consider the behaviour of two groups of consumers. The …rst group of consumers are those that are fortunate enough to have been treated by a high ability specialist in period zero. The second group of consumers consists of all consumers who are not members of group one. This includes both patients who were not sick in period zero, patients who were sick in period zero but were unfortunate enough to be treated by a low ability specialist and patients who were sick but chose not to seek treatment in that period. The lifetime utility after period zero will be di¤erent for these two groups of patients. The …rst time a patient in group one gets sick after period zero, his lifetime expected utility if he seeks treatment will be
If a patient in group two seeks a referral after period one, he knows that he will be referred to a high ability specialist. As such, he will learn the identity of a high ability specialist. Thus, the …rst time a patient in group two gets sick after period zero, his lifetime expected utility if he seeks a referral and treatment is
With these lifetime expected utilities in hand, we can characterise the circumstances under which members of each will choose to seek treatment when they are sick.
Proposition 16 (Participation constraint for informed patients): A patient who knows the identity of a high ability medical specialist will treatment whenever he is sick if and only if r B. Furthermore, if r > B he will never seek treatment.
Proof. The remaining lifetime expected utility of a sick patient who knows the identity of a high ability specialist is given by V i;1 . Furthermore, this is true for any period in which he is sick. This patient will seek treatment when he is sick if and only if V i;1 0. This requires that r B. Thus a patient who knows the identity of a high ability specialist will seek treatment whenever he is sick if and only if r B.
Proposition 17 (Participation constraint for uniformed patients who have access to an informed GP): A patient who does not know the identity of a high ability specialist but whose GP does know the identity of such a specialist will weakly prefer to seek both a referral and treatment over no treatment when he is …rst sick if and only if
Furthermore, if such a patient seeks both a referral and treatment the …rst time he is sick and w 0, he will seek treatment whenever he is sick from that point in time onwards.
Proof. The remaining lifetime expected utility of a sick patient who does not knows the identity of a high ability specialist but whose GP does know the identity of a high ability specialist is given by V i;1 if that patient seeks both a referral and treatment. This patient will prefer to seek both a referral and treatment if and only if V i;1 0. This requires that 1 + 1 (B r) w 0, which can be rearranged to yield
Furthermore, note that following the referral and treatment, such a patient will know the identity of a high ability specialist. We know that informed patients will be willing to seek treatment whenever they are sick if r B. Finally, if w 0 and uninformed patients with access to an informed GP seeks a referral after period zero, then it must the case that r B.
Recall that repetition does not a¤ect the participation decision of specialists. As such, the participation constraint facing specialists in this dynamic health care markets with GPs will be the same as that facing them in a static health care market. We are now in a position to characterise the conditions under which a dynamic health care market with GPs will exist.
Proposition 18 (Treatment market existence): If all sick patients seek treatment in period zero, then the treatment market will exist after period zero whenever C S B. However, some patients will choose not to seek treatment if r 2 max C S ;
(
Proof. Recall that patients are not allowed to seek treatment without a referral in period zero. As such, if every sick patient in period zero seeks treatment, then every sick patient will also seek a referral. Since each GP has an in…nite patient pool, this means that each GP will almost surely have an in…nite number of sick patients in period zero. We have already shown that this ensures that each GP will be able to discover the identity of at least one high ability specialist. Since a GP only discovers the identity of a high ability specialist when at least one of his patients is treated by a high ability specialist, we know that at least one patient from the patient pool of each GP must also learn the identity of a high ability specialist. This means that there will be at least J informed patients at the end of period zero. If these patients are ever sick from the beginning of period one onwards, they will seek treatment whenever r B. Specialists will be willing to provide a referral if and only if r C S . As such, the treatment market will exist if and only if C S B. On the other hand, if C S > B, then the treatment market will not exist. The mere existence of the treatment market does not mean that all sick patients will choose to seek treatment. Clearly informed patients will seek treatment. However, uninformed patients might not do so. Recall that uninformed patients would be willing to seek treatment without a referral if and only if
Furthermore, assuming that w 0, uninformed patients will be willing to seek treatment with a referral if and only if
Thus uninformed patients will only participate in the treatment market if
If the treatment market exists but this condition does not hold, then it must be the case that
and r 2 [C S ; B]. This means that uninformed patients will not participate in the treatment market despite the fact that it exists. Since GPs are also present in the health care sector now, we also need to consider the existence of a referral market. This requires us to examine participation constraints for patients and GPs in the referral market after period zero. Proof. Recall that
Consider an uniformed patient who is sick at some time after period zero. If this patient seeks both a referral and treatment, his remaining lifetime expected utility will be
If the patient seeks treatment without a referral, his remaining lifetime expected utility will be
Finally, if the patient seeks neither treatment nor referral, his remaining lifetime expected utility will be zero. A patient will prefer to seek to seek a referral and treatment to no treatment whatsoever if and only if
This can be rearranged to obtain
Furthermore, a patient will prefer to seek both a referral and treatment over treatment alone if and only if
Proposition 20 (GP participation constraint): GPs will o¤ er their referral services whenever w C GP .
Proof. We have already established that patients can deter GPs from referring them to low ability specialists. As such, repetition does not a¤ect the participation decision of GPs. Recall that there are no …xed referral costs and constant marginal referral costs. As such, the average cost of a referral is constant. Indeed, it is simply the marginal referral cost. Hence GPs will participate if and only if the referral price exceeds this referral cost. This requires that w C GP .
With the participation constraints for patients and GPs in hand, we are now in a position to establish the conditions under which a referral market will exist.
Proposition 21 (Referral market existence): A referral market will exist if and only if both
and there exists at least one uniformed patient.
Proof. Note that only uninformed patients will seek a referral after period zero. As such, we need there to be at least one uninformed patient for there to be any demand for the referral services of a GP. These patients will seek a referral if and only if
GPs will o¤er their referral services if and only if w C GP . As such, the set of referral prices for which both patients and GPs are willing to participate in the referral market will be non-empty if and only if
Finally, we are in a position to comment on the impact that the introduction of GPs has on the threshold treatment price for market existence.
Proposition 22 (Treatment price when a referral market exists): If the referral market exists whenever there is an uninformed patient, then the threshold treatment price will satisfy the following condition:
Proof. Recall that, for the referral market to exist, we need
As such, we know that
Furthermore, we also know that
VI A comparison of treatment market outcomes
We can now compare the various circumstances in which a treatment market will exist and the treatment outcomes in each of these circumstances. Recall that a static treatment market will exist if C S r B = b r s , while a dynamic treatment market without GPs will exist if
Furthermore, a dynamic treatment market with GPs in which all sick patients seek treatment will exist if
Finally, a dynamic treatment market with GPs in which only informed patients seek treatment will exist if
Repetition alone expands the range of treatment prices for which the treatment market will exist. Repetition and the presence of GPs might expand the range of treatment prices that are consistent with treatment market existence even further.
Treatment market outcomes will vary with the nature of the market and the prevailing prices. In both the static market and the dynamic market without GPs, all patients will seek and obtain treatment whenever the treatment price lies between the cost of treatment and the relevant threshold treatment price. However, in both cases, patients will not know whether or not they will be cured. Some patients will be cured, while some patients will not be cured. In a dynamic market with GPs, all patients will seek treatment if the treatment price lies between the cost of treatment and the threshold price for uninformed patients. However, if the treatment price lies between the threshold treatment price for uninformed patients and the bene…t from good health, then only the informed patients will seek treatment. In both of these cases, all of the patients who seek treatment will be cured.
VII Information externalities and the need for regulation
While characterising the outcomes in dynamic markets with GPs, we assumed that all sick patients were required to seek a referral and treatment in period zero. This allowed every GP to learn the identity of at least one high ability specialist before the start of the next period. In this section, we will examine patients referral choices in period zero. We will show that all sick patients choosing to seek a referral in that period is not an equilibrium outcome. The intuition for this result involves the presence of a positive information externality. Individual patients bear the entire cost of obtaining a referral. However, they do not capture any of the bene…ts from that referral. The patient would learn the ability level of one of the specialists if he sought treatment regardless of whether or not he also sought a referral. The bene…t from the referral is that the GP also learns the ability level of one of the specialists for each referral that he makes. Given the presence of this positive externality, it is not surprising that patients may choose to consume too few referrals in period zero, from a social welfare point of view. As such, some policy to correct for this may be warranted. Potential policies include a requirement that patients seek a referral before obtaining treatment in period zero or some form of subsidy for patients who seek a referral. As we noted in the introduction to this paper, the cost of treatment is often subsidised for patients who seek a referral in Australia.
Proposition 23 (The need for regulation): No sick patients will voluntarily seek a referral in period zero if referrals are not free.
Proof. The proof will proceed as follows. First, we will show that a sick patient's expected continuation payo¤ does not vary with his period zero referral choice. As such, he will maximise his lifetime expected utility by maximising his period zero expected utility. We will then show that a sick patient will maximise his period zero expected utility by choosing not to seek a referral. Suppose that patient i is sick in period zero. Further suppose that he is a member of GP j's patient pool. Let S 0 j denote the set of all patients in GP j's patient pool who are sick in period zero, S 0 j; i denote the set of all patients in GP j's patient pool other than patient i who are sick in period zero and denote the proportion of patients in S 0 i who choose to seek a referral in period zero. We have already shown that the number of sick patients in each GPs patient pool in period zero is almost surely in…nity. As such there will also almost surely be an in…nite number of sick patients in GP j's patient pool in period zero excluding patient i. As such, if 2 (0; 1], then there will almost surely be an in…nite number of patients seeking a referral from GP j in period zero. This will allow GP j to learn the ability of at least one high ability specialist, regardless of whether or not patient i seeks a referral in period zero. As such, GP j will be an informed GP from period one onwards. Furthermore, the probability that a patient becomes informed at the end of period zero is not altered by his referral choice. As such, the expected continuation payo¤ for patient i will not be altered by his period zero referral decision. This means that his lifetime expected utility maximising referral choice in period zero can be found by simply maximising his period zero expected utility.
Suppose instead that = 0. In this case no patients other than patient i will seek a referral from GP j in period zero. As such, patient i's period zero referral decision will alter the probability that GP j learns the identity of a high ability specialist at the end of period zero. If patient i seeks a referral in period zero, then GP j will become informed if and only if patient i is cured in period zero. Patient iwill be cured if and only if he is treated by a high ability specialist. The probability of this occurring is > 0. On the other hand, if patient i does not seek a referral, then no patients will seek a referral from GP j in period zero. As such, GP j cannot become informed at the end of period zero. Note that if GP j becomes informed at the end of period zero, then so does patient i. Furthermore, if patient i becomes informed, he cannot bene…t from seeking further referrals. As such, the patient's continuation payo¤ when he is informed does not vary with GP j's knowledge about specialist abilities. Furthermore, if patient i seeks a referral and does not get cured, then both patient i and GP j will be uninformed at the end of period zero. This is exactly the situation they would be in if patient i had not sought a referral and had not been cured. As such, the continuation payo¤ facing patient i if he is not informed at the end of period zero does not vary with his period zero referral decision. Furthermore, the probability that patient i becomes informed at the end of period zero is not a¤ected by his period zero referral decision. Since the continuation payo¤ to player i when he is informed, the continuation payo¤ when he is uninformed and the probability that he becomes informed do not vary with his period zero referral decision, we can conclude that his expected continuation payo¤ does not vary with his period zero referral decision. As such, patient i's period zero referral decision will maximise his lifetime expected utility if it maximises his period zero expected utility.
The expected utility for a patient in period zero if he seeks both a referral and treatment is EU i (ref erral) = B r w.
The expected utility for a patient in period zero if he seeks only treatment is
with the inequality being strict if w > 0. As such, a patient will choose not to seek a referral in period zero if referrals are not free. Since this is true for all patients, we can conclude that no patients will seek a referral in period zero if referrals are not free. Unfortunately, sick patients will not seek referrals in period zero. As such, GPs will not be able to learn the identity of at least one high ability specialist at the end of period zero. This problem is the result of a positive information externality. While each patient incurs the entire cost of any referral that he seeks, he does not capture all of the expected bene…ts from the referral. As such, it is not surprising that patients will tend to seek too few referrals. This suggests that some form of regulation might be needed if each GP is to be able to learn the identity of at least one high ability specialist. Suppose that any sick patient who wants to obtain treatment in period zero is required to obtain a referral prior to seeking treatment. Will such patients still choose to obtain treatment in period zero?
Proposition 24 (Patient participation constraint for period zero): If sick patients are required to obtain a referral before seeking treatment in period zero, then they will seek treatment if and only if
Proof. The lifetime expected utility of a sick patient in period zero who chooses to seek both a referral and treatment can be decomposed into three terms. These terms are the patient's expected utility in period zero, his continuation utility if he becomes informed at the end of period zero and his continuation utility if he does not become informed at the end of period zero. The continuation payo¤s will also need to be weighted by the probability of their occurrence. We will assume throughout that all of the other sick patients during period zero choose to seek a referral. Since we are deriving a condition under which this will be true, this assumption will be valid if that condition holds. The patient's expected utility in period zero is
His continuation utility if learns the identity of a high ability specialist during period zero is
His continuation utility if he does not learn the identity of a high ability specialist during period zero is
This expression simpli…es to
Thus the patients lifetime expected utility if he seeks a referral is
w (1 + ) , which can be rearranged to obtain
Clearly, the patient will choose to seek a referral if and only if V i 0, which requires that
This expression can be rearranged to obtain w 1 + 1 + 2
Finally, we need to establish the conditions under which the treatment and referral markets will exist in period zero.
Proposition 25 (Treatment market existence in period zero): If there is a regulation requiring any patient that wants treatment in period zero to obtain a referral as well, then the treatment market will only exist if Proposition 26 (Referral market existence in period zero): Even with a regulation requiring any patient that wants treatment in period zero to obtain a referral as well, the referral market will only exist if
Proof. If this condition is not satis…ed, then the participation constraints for patients and GPs cannot be simultaneously satis…ed.
VIII Conclusion
The medical profession in some countries displays a gated structure. The main focus of this paper has been on explaining both the existence of general practitioners who refer patients to one of many ultimate specialists and providing a rationale for regulations that encourage the use of referrals. The results in this paper are complementary to those obtained in Eldridge (2007b) . In that paper, the gated industry structure observed in some professional service industries provided an arti…cial long-run relationship between patients and specialists when, in the absence of GPs, they would only have a short-run relationship. The arti…cial long-run relationship between patients and specialists enabled them to avoid a market failure resulting from shirking on the part of specialists. This industry structure was largely driven by the demands of patients, although there were some circumstances in which the presence of GPs improved the welfare of both patients and specialists. While we provided an explanation for the gated structure of some professional service industries in Eldridge (2007b) , that explanation did not provide a rationale for regulations that encouraged such a structure. In this paper, we have provided a rationale for such regulations. However, while patients in the model employed in Eldridge (2007b) had an incentive to repeatedly seek a referral for the treatment of non-chronic diseases, patients in the model employed in this paper will seek a referral at most twice. The reason for this di¤erence relates to the underlying market failure. In Eldridge (2007b) , the underlying market failure is a moral hazard problem. Specialists could alter their e¤ort choices from period to period. As such, they constantly needed to be induced to provide high e¤ort treatment. In this paper, the underlying market failure is an adverse selection problem. The ability level of a specialist is private information, known only by that specialist. However, this ability level is …xed for all time. Thus, if a patient learns the identity of a high e¤ort specialist, he will obtain no additional bene…ts from seeking further referrals.
In actual health care markets, patients might well seek a referral on a number of occasions. As such, it would appear that the limited number of referrals that are predicted by the model in this paper is somewhat unrealistic. However, that result is generated by the stationary population of agents in the model employed in this paper. In actual health care markets, the populations of patients, GPs and specialists will be in a constant state of ‡ux. In each period, some new agents will arrive and some old agents will leave. Thus we would expect the outcomes in actual health care markets to re ‡ect aspects of both the period zero outcomes and the later period outcomes of the model employed in this paper.
